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IMPACT OF COVERAGE ON THE RELIABILITY 
OFAFAULTTOLERANTCOMPUTER 
Salvatore J .  Bavuso 
Langley Research Center 
SUMMARY 
A mathematical reliability model is established for  a reconfigurable fault tolerant 
avionic computer system utilizing state -of -the -art computers. System reliability is stud- 
ied in  light of the coverage probabilities associated with the first and second independent 
hardware failures.  Coverage models are presented as a function of detection, isolation, 
and recovery probabilities. Upper and lower bounds are established for  the coverage prob- 
abilities and the method for  computing values for  the coverage probabilities is investigated. 
Further ,  an architectural  variation is proposed which is shown to enhance coverage. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years ,  the l i terature has contained numerous fault tolerant computer 
architectural designs which are enumerated in reference 1.  
f rom the majority of those reported is the usual presentation of a cursory reliability 
assessment with comparable heuristic justification, if any assessment a t  all is present.  
What is strikingly apparent 
Early attempts to a r r ive  a t  realist ic reliability estimates for computer systems 
appear to be due to Roth and Bouricius, et al. (ref. 2). With their  presentation of the prob- 
abilistic concept of coverage, it was shown that coverage, defined as the conditional prob- 
ability that a proper recovery occurs if a fault exis ts ,  must approach 100 percent to gain 
the potential reliability attainable by modular replacement systems (ref.  3) .  P r i o r  to  this 
t ime, reliability analyses have assumed a coverage of unity upon omission of this concept 
in reliability equations. 
The application of the coverage concept to contemporary computer systems was 
reported by Sklaroff et al. (ref. 4). They express  coverage fo r  a two-fault tolerant tr iplex 
configuration as two components, a coverage component for the f i r s t  failure and a coverage 
component for  the second failure. A reliability comparison between three triplex systems 
with different failure coverage components is presented. Triplex system A is assigned a 
first failure coverage of unity and a second failure coverage of X 3 0.5 S X 9 1. Triplex 
system C is assigned the coverage probability of X 3 0.5 S X 5 1 for both first and second 
I I l1111111l11l1111llIIl~ II 1l111lllIIllIl 
failures.  Systems A and C a r e  mas ter  slave architectures; and system B, which assumes 
a first failure coverage of unity and a second failure coverage X 3 0.5 5 X S 1, is a con- 
figuration in which all computers issue outputs to an external unit. The work presented 
in this paper addresses the latter system similarly to the analysis that was performed for  
triplex system C, with the addition of establishing upper and lower bounds on the first and 
second failure coverages, C1 and C2, and a method for  computing values for C1 and 
C2 is investigated. In order  to  make the resul ts  realist ic,  the fault tolerant avionic flight 
control computer system utilized for  this study is composed of three identical contempo- 
r a r y  simplex computers. 
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SYMBOLS 
event, A channel is operational 
event, channel A detects a fault in the other channel (B) 
event, channel A detects a fault in itself 
event, B channel is operational 
event, channel B detects a fault in the other channel (A) 
event, channel B detects a fault in itself 
probability of the system defined in figure 2 entering state S given that 
the system was previously in state Sj-1 and that an unrepairable fault 
occurred in a channel where 1 5 j 5 2; failure coverage 
j 
fault detection event 
event, no detection of a fault 
event, correct  detection of a fault for  subset j; j = 1, single failure simplex 
isolating; j = 2, single failure c ros s  isolating 
event, incorrect detection of a fault 
fault event 
fault isolation event 
T input unit composed of ADC's 
i , j  integers 
0 
P (  1 probability of event ( ) occurring 
Pj(t) probability of the system being in state j at time t 
output unit composed of DAC's 
Pj ( D,I,R c I ) A  F = C j 
d ~ .  P.(DJF) 
J J  
i A  pj = P ~ ( I ~ D , F )  
i 
kPj  
Ip j  = A P~(R,~D,I,F) 
conditional probability the system will detect, isolate, and recon- 
figure and recover given that the jth fault occurred 
conditional probability the system will detect a fault given that the 
jth fault occurred 
conditional probability the system will isolate (to a channel) a fault 
given that the jth fault was detected and the fault occurred 
isolation probability in channel k in state j 
conditional probability the system will reconfigure and recover 
given that the jth fault was detected and isolated and the fault 
occurred 
p 2  
Psf 
Q 
i 
QA 
QB 
R 
RA 
R B  
isolation probability which is identical for  both duplex channels 
probability of system failure 
unreliability given by 1 - R 
unreliability of channel A ,  
unreliability of channel B ,  
reliability given by exp (- At) 
reliability of channel A 
reliability of channel B 
1 - RA 
1 - RB 
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reconfiguration event 
event, the system fails to recover upon channel failure while attempting to  
reconfigure from j channels to j-1 channels 
jth state of the triplex system 
time 
coverage probability defined in reference 4 
ith operational channel 
ith malfunctioned channel 
constant hardware failure rake of simplex computer 
defined as 
such that 
complementary event, for example, the complement of event A is 
conditional event 
exclusive "or" operation 
inclusive "or" operation 
Boo le an "and'' operation 
Boolean "or" operation 
much greater  than 
Abbreviations: 
ADC analog-to digital converter 
BITE built-in tes t  equipment 
4 
csc contemporary simplex computer 
DAC digital -to -analog converter 
MTTF mean time to failure 
RCS reconfigurable computer system 
FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER RELIABILITY MODEL 
The computer architecture selected fo r  this study appears in  figure 1 as a triplex 
reconfigurable computer system (RCS) composed of three identical computer channels. 
The contemporary simplex computer (CSC) contained within each channel is a typical aero-  
space c lass  machine with a 16 000 word memory and a memory add t ime of 2 p s .  In an 
aircraf t  environment, the CSC mean time to failure (MTTF) is predicted to be 3275 hr .  
The ? unit is composed of 20 analog-to-digital converters (ADC's) with a combined 
MTTF of 4000 h r  and the 0 unit is composed qf 20 digital-to-analog converters (DAC's) 
with a combined MTTF of 5500 hr .  A channel composed of a CSC, an unit, and an 
0 unit is assigned a predicted MTTF of 1357 h r  which reflects the environmental effects 
of an operational aircraft .  A mission time of 10 h r  is assumed; a lso channel voting/ 
comparing is performed by software via an interprocessor bus. 
The Markov state space modeling technique was selected to represent  a mathemati- 
cal  reliability model for the described system. Reference 5 describes the theoretical 
basis for this technique. A Markov state space model of the triplex channel computer 
system with coverage factors fo r  both f i r s t  and second channel fa i lures  was developed and 
is presented in figure 2. The figure defines four system states  of interest ,  s ta tes  So to 
S3, where event Xi is defined as the ith operational channel and event zi is the ith 
malfunctioned channel, 1 2 i 5 3. State So is the condition where all channels are oper- 
ational and is expressed as the Boolean product of three events, So = XlX2X3. State S3 
is the system-failure state and occurs  when the system does not recover upon a channel 
failure while attempting to reconfigure from 3 channels to 2 channels event 2.) or  s imi-  
larly does not recover upon a channel failure while in  the dual state (:E) or all channels 
fail. The figures between state nodes are transitional probabilities composed of coverage 
components C1 and C2, X, A t ,  a n d a  constant. The parameters  C1 and C2 are 
defined as the probability of the system entering state S1 and S2 given that the system 
was previously in state So and SI, respectively, and that an unrepairable fault occurred 
in a channel. Repairable faults, such as benign electrical  transient faults, do not cause a 
change of system state, since this c lass  of faults can be mitigated by machine state vector 
transfer o r  software rollback. Unrepairable transients , such as intermittent and long 
3- ( 
5 
duration faults, do cause a change of system state. Their effects can be incorporated by 
summing the unrepairable transient fault rate (assumed constant with time) with the chan- 
nel hardware failure rate. The parameter h is the channel hardware failure ra te  and is 
assumed to be constant for this model. It is related to the reciprocal of the MTTF, by 
h = l/MTTF. The constant multiplier in the transitional probability te rm relates to the 
number of operational channels pr ior  to failure and A t  is an increment of time. 
The RCS model can be expressed as a system of f i rs t -order  ordinary differential 
equations (discrete state, continuous time) 
d P  1 (t) -= 3XC1PO(t) - 2hPl(t)  
dt 
dP2(t) -= 2XC P (t) - XP2(t) dt 2 1  
_.- dP3(t)  3X(1 - C1)Po(t) -t 2X(1 - C,)Pl(t) + XP2(t) 
dt 
where Po is the probability of the system being in state So, that is 
= PPO) P1 = P("$ P2 = P(s2) P 3  = P(s3) 
and the initial conditions a r e  
PO(O) = 1 P1(0) = P2(0) = P3(0) = 0 
The derivation of these equations can be found by inspection of the graph in figure 2 
by utilizing the following analog: From signal flow graph theory, the probability of the 
system being in state S. is the analog of a signal source and the transition probability is J 
the analog of a transmission gain. The probability of the system being in state S j  at 
time t + At is the sum of all signals arriving at the Sj  node. The other nodes behave 
as probability sources at time t. For  example, the ordinary differential equation asso- 
ciated with s ta te  zero  is given by 
Po(t + At) = Po(t) - 3XClAtPO(t) - 3h(l - Cl)AtPo(t) 
6 
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Rearranging t e rms  and taking a limit gives 
At-0 
The solution to the 
sented as follows: 
POW = 
Pl(t) = 
= 
P3W = 
Po(t + At) - Po(t) 
At 
d P  (t) 
dt = 0= -3XP0(t) lim 
system of differential equations was derived analytically and is pre  - 
The resul ts  of the probability of system failure Psf at 10 h r  of mission time as a function 
of C1 and C2 are plotted in figure 3 fo r  P3. In the best  case when C1 = C2 = 1, the 
Psf is predicted at 3.96 X at 10 h r  of mission time. For C1 and C2 less than 
unity, Psf increases  exponentially with C2. 
Intuitively, it  is obvious that pr ior  to fault recovery via reconfiguration, a fault must 
be detected and located by the computer system. It will be seen later that both of these 
factors can be incorporated in the computation of C1 and C2. During initial operation, 
however, three computers are available for  fault detection and isolation and, therefore,  it 
is expected that C1 will be very nearly unity; whereas,  after the first channel failure,  
fault isolation must be accomplished without a majority vote and is expected to cause C2 
to be much less than unity. The l i terature is extremely sparse  in predicting values for  
C1; however, reference 4 indicates C2 20.95 at the present state of the art (assuming 
perfect recovery from transient faults and perfect software in a correctly designed 
system). 
When C1 S 0.999, an interesting phenomenon occurs.  The data (observed in fig. 3) 
indicate that Psf becomes insensitive to  C2, that is, for  some C1 < 0.999, Psf 
becomes insensitive to changes in  C2. The implication is that if C1 is not sufficiently 
greater  than 0.999, the achievement of high C2 is unimportant; hence C1 = 0.999 is 
assigned as a reasonable lower bound for  this computer architecture. In view of the fact 
that hitherto C1 has been essentially ignored by the usual assumption of C1 = 1, it 
appears that attention should be focused on determining realistic values of C1. Alter- 
7 
nately, when C1 > 0.999, the data show that high gains in  system reliability can be 
approached only if C2 > 0.94; hence, C2 = 0.94 is assigned as a lower bound. The 
data depicted in figure 3 show that for  C2 5 0.996, little gain in  reliability occurs  for  
C1 > 0.99999 (note superposition of such curves). The coverage value, C1 = 0.99999, 
may be assigned to this model as a reasonable upper bound, that is, the achievement of 
coverages greater  than 0.99999 contributes little for  this contemporary system since 
it is unlikely that values of C2 >> 0.996 can be achieved as is shown later. 
Cj COMPUTATION 
In the previous discussion, a mathematical relationship between RCS Psf and 
coverage components was developed. Theoretical coverage bounds were established fo r  
system first and second failure coverage components. This section investigates the 
coverage contribution of simplex computer channels to the first and second failure cover - 
age components. 
The jth failure coverage C. may be defined as J 
cj A ~j (D,I,R,~F) 
that is, the jth failure coverage is the probability that the system will detect a fault, i so-  
late the fault to a channel, and reconfigure and recover given that a fault occurred. Since 
Rc is dependent on D, I, and F; I is dependent on D and F; and D is dependent 
on F, Cj may be further defined as the product of conditional probabilities. (See appen- 
dix A for  derivation.) 
Fu r  the r 
where 
c. 4 rpj . 
J 
rP. = P. R D,I,F 
3 3 (  .I ) 
i ~ j  = P~(I~D,F) 
dPj = Pj(DIF) 
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For the first failure coverage 
c1 = d P1. iPl - rPl 
This equation expresses  the events and their  occurrence probabilities associated with the 
computer system's ability to t raverse  from the triplex state So to the duplex state S1 
as a resul t  of a permanent channel failure. 
plished by channel majority voting. After this process , accomplished primarily by soft- 
i ware,  is completed, the values of dP1, 
correctness of the system hardware and software design and the correctness  of the soft- 
ware code. The utility of software self-testing or  BITE (built-in test equipment) is less- 
ened by the massive hardware channel redundancy. However , since 100-percent hardware 
and software design verification and code correctness  verification are still unachievable, 
C1 
the common practice of inserting identical copies of software into each CSC. In most 
cases  , operational software contains latent software e r r o r s ,  e r r o r s  not discovered during 
the software debugging and testing process.  Such e r r o r s  will never be detected by the 
majority voting process.  The consequences of this type of e r r o r  occurrence can be 
devastating to an aircraf t  which utilizes this computer system as the sole flight control 
system computer. 
Failure detection and isolation can be accom- 
PI, and rPl are determined essentially by the 
is most likely less  than unity. A simple example to  demonstrate this point regards  
The availability of massive channel redundancy, however, does not obviate the need 
since BITE is a hardware design 
F o r  instance, 
for  BITE and software self-test in the triplex state 
implementation and, as such, is somewhat independent of software design. 
a latent software e r r o r  although not detected by majority voting may trigger a BITE detec- 
tor  indicating, for example , an  overflow condition. Similarly , software self-testing should 
not be abandoned either since latent hardware faults and transient -caused faults (perma- 
nently altered unprotected memory) can be detected and perhaps corrected pr ior  to the 
execution of certain cri t ical  applications programs such as end of mission (autoland) 
programs. Thus, when hardware and software design and software coding a r e  considered 
cor rec t ,  it is reasonable to assume that 
So 
dpl  2 p 1  = r p1 =. 1 
and 
c1 =. 1 
Of greater  interest  is the case where j = 2,  and the second failure coverage is 
given by 
9 
c2 = dP2 * i P2 * rP2 
For  this case the probability of isolation becomes a predominant factor for since 
intuitively one recognizes that there  is a high probability of detection by comparison; and 
if a fault could be isolated to a simplex computer, it is reasonable to believe there is a 
high probability of the system affecting a proper recovery. Assuming in the best case 
C2 
i that dP2 = rPZ = 1, C2 can be studied in light of P2. 
For  j = 2,  the second failure coverage is expressed by 
c2 = d P2 * iP2 * rP2 
where 
dP2 = 1 iP2 5 1 rP2 = 1 
In the duplex mode, 'P2 is based on the simplex computer failure detection probability 
which is a function of the isolation tes t  thoroughness, testing time, and BITE detecting 
effectiveness. 
A system architecture that res t r ic t s  software testing to a single simplex computer 
such that each simplex machine is capable of determining i t s  own health is defined as a 
simplex isolating architecture. With this type of architecture configured in the duplex 
mode, the probability of isolation is identical to the probability of detection in a simplex 
computer. This conclusion is demonstrated in appendix B. Utilizing the state-of-the-art 
value for fault detection in a simplex computer which is given in reference 4 as 0.95, 
P3 = 0.95 and, therefore, C2 = 0.95. Fo r  C1 = 0.9999 and C2 = 0.95, figure 3 indi- i 
cates a PSf of 1.2 X as a reasonable state-of-the-art goal. This value for Psf 
contrasts against the theoretical minimum of 3.96 X lo-? An interesting variation on 
determining the system isolation probability, which to this author's knowledge has not been 
discussed in the l i terature,  is to remove the restriction of self-testing to a single simplex 
computer. By allowing each simplex computer access  to the other's regis ters ,  each 
machine can tes t  itself as well as the other (cross  isolating architecture). In this case,  
each machine can be conceptually considered as a fault detector searching for a fault in 
the union of the two simplex computer fault se ts .  The union of the fault se t s  becomes the 
universal fault set;  and since the isolation events a r e  independent 
il i2 i i 
iP2 = P2 + P2 - 1P2 * 2P2 
10 
i 
where 
rationale for  this conclusion is presented in appendix B. On letting 
kP2 is the isolation probability in machine number k for  1 5 k 5 2. The 
i 1P2= '2 P 2 =  A ?  P2 
then 
c2 = ( 2 ? P2 - i.;). d p 2 .  rp2 
and 
since 
dP2 = rP2 = 1 
by assumption. For 
iP2 = 0.95 C2 = 0.998 
Using C1 = 0.9999 and C2 = 0.998, the probability of system failure approaches 
2.8 x 
of 3.96 X 
a t  10 h r  of mission time which is contrasted against the theoretical minimum 
at 10 h r  when C1 = C2 = 1. 
On observing figure 3 ,  the upper bound for  C1 in a simplex isolating architecture 
is 0.99999, since for  C2 =: 0.95, all the curves for  C1 2 0.99999 are superimposed. 
Fo r  c ros s  isolating architectures by contrast ,  the upper bound for  C1 is 0.999999 since 
C2 is likely to approach 0.998. 
When rP2 is assumed as a variable in a c ros s  isolating architecture 
c2 = ( ?  2 1P2 3 P 2 3  - rP2 
i Figure 4 depicts the sensitivity of C2 to rP2 and Pa. The data show that C2 is 
considerably more sensitive to changes in rP2 than to 'P2; in  fact, for  reasonably 
obtainable values of iP2 (0.9 < iP2 < , C2 is nearly completely determined by 
rP2. This observation suggests that considerable effort be devoted toward improving 
rP2 rather  than iP2 when iP2 > 0.95 and the computer architecture is a c r o s s  iso- 
lating architecture. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A mathematical model was established for  the reliability of a reconfigurable fault 
tolerant avionic computer system utilizing contemporary simplex computers. 
reliability was computed as a function of a particular system configuration, mean time to  
failure f o r  a contemporary simplex computer, mission t ime, and two coverage parameters ,  
one associated with the first independent hardware failure 
second failure C2. 
The system 
C1 and the other with the 
Two variations of a duplex configuration were addressed and termed, simplex iso-  
lating architecture and c ross  isolating architecture. 
res t r ic t s  software testing to  a single simplex computer such that each simplex machine 
is capable of determining i t s  own health. The latter architecture proposed by the author 
removes the restriction regarding software testing to a single simplex computer such 
that it allows each simplex computer access  to the other's reg is te rs ,  enabling each 
machine to tes t  itself as well as the other. 
The former  system architecture 
A lower bound for  the f i r s t  failure coverage C1 was established a t  0.999. When 
c1 5 0.999, the system probability of failure becomes independent of the second failure 
coverage C2 so that i f  C1 is not sufficiently greater  than 0.999, the achievement of 
C2 is unimportant. 
values of C1. 
This result suggests that more attention be focused on determining 
For  a simplex isolating architecture,  where values of C2 will probably be less 
than o r  equal to 0.95, an upper bound for  C1 
isolating architectures where C2 approaches 0.998, the upper bound for C1 appears 
to be 0.999999. When C1 > 0.999, the model data predict that high gains in system reli- 
ability can be approached only if  second failure coverage values are much larger  than 
0.94; therefore,  C2 = 0.94 is assigned as a reasonable lower bound for  C2. The upper 
bound for C2 for the described triplex system is 0.998. 
of 0.99999 was established. Fo r  c ros s  
A model for computing C1 and C2 was proposed for  a c ros s  isolating architec- 
ture ,  and an estimate for  
recovery in the duplex configuration is assumed and the probability of isolating a fault 
iP2 is given as 0.95. Assuming C1 = 0.9999 and C2 = 0.998, the probability of system 
failure approaches 2.8 x at 10 h r  which is contrasted against the theoretical minimum 
of 3.96 X at 10 h r  when C1 = C2 = 1. The coverage estimates,  primarily attributed 
to C2 < 1, appear to increase the probability of system failure by an order  of magnitude. 
Further ,  it was shown that the major contributor to C , for a c ros s  isolating architec- 
ture ,  is the probability of reconfiguring and recovery rP2 in lieu of the failure isolation 
C2 was calculated to be 0.998 when perfect detection and 
2 
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I 
r probability 'Pa and suggests that considerable effort be devoted toward improving Pa 
) ra ther  than iP2 (for iP2 > 0.95 . 
Finally, it should be noted that the modeling techniques developed in this paper are 
easily modified to study the case of three failures o r  greater  tolerant systems and may 
be utilized to predict reliabilities for  higher order  systems. 
Langley Research Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Hampton, Va. 23665 
June 9,  1975 
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APPENDIX A 
Cj DERIVATION 
The following derivation is a straightforward application of conditional probabilities. 
C. = Pj(D,I,RcIF) = Pj(Rc,D,I(F), DnInR, = RcnDnI 
J 
by commutivity. 
Cj = Pj(Rc,D,IIF) = Pj(Rc,D,I,F) Ipj(F) 
Pj(D,I,F) = Pj(I,D,F) = Pj(IID,F)Pj(D,F) 
Pj(D,F) = Pj(DIF)Pj(F) 
14 
APPENDIX B 
PROBABILITY OF ISOLATION DERIVATION 
In the duplex mode, 'P2 is a function of the health of each machine, A and B, 
which can be modeled by the Poisson reliability model, R = ,-It, the ability of each 
machine to detect a fault in i tself ,  dAs and dBs, and the ability of each machine to 
detect a fault in the other machine, dAo and dBo. By allowing each event to be a 
binary event, there  are 26 = 64 possible combination system states  depicted in  table 1 
which represent the universal sample space. By definition, the duplex system probability 
of fault detection is assigned unity; therefore, the subset of sample points which contains 
one or more  fai lures  (fault subset) is used to determine the probability of isolation. The 
fault subset may be partitioned to form 1 2  subsets of interest  which a r e  depicted as 
follows: 
-. . . 
Single 
failure 
Double 
failure 
Subset for  - 
Simplex isolating 
1 
3 
5 
7 
9 
11 
Cross  isolating 
8 
10 
12 
The heading, simplex isolating, defines the dual architecture with respect to detection, in 
that each machine cannot detect a fault in the other machine. The heading, c ros s  isolating, 
removes this restriction. System detection of faults can be either correct ,  incorrect,  o r  
no detection may occur at all. 
fault o r  a double fault ei ther simultaneously or nearly so. 
The system could experience a single unrepairable channel 
Subsets 1 and 2 are of particular interest  since they represent  the case in which the 
machine fault detectors are so  designed that i f  they announce the detection of a fault, then 
the fault physically exists.  It is postulated that if  a processor  is capable of announcing the 
15  
APPENDIX B - Continued 
existence of a fault then the fault is real. Subsets 3 and 4 f o r  single failures cover the 
cases where phantom faults are announced. Only subsets 1 and 2 are considered in this 
paper. 
The sample points for  “Df appear in table 1 as S5, Sl0, S18, s26, S33, and 
These events are represented by the following equations: S37. 
S , = A E d A s  d- A, d- Bs d- Bo 
d- d d- d- S l o = A B  As A, Bs Bo 
S26 = x B  d- As d A, d Bs d- Bo 
-d- d- d- d S 3 3 = A B  A, A, Bs Bo 
S37 = A B d A s  d- A, d- Bs d Bo 
where the 1 indicates for A and B that the event failed and for d As, d A,, dBs, and 
dBo that the event occurred. The 0 indicates for  A and B that the event did not fail 
and for the others that the event did not occur. 
The conditional event C Df/AQB is functionally related to the union of sample 
points S 5, Sl0, SI87 s26, S33, and S37. By straightforward application of conditional 
probabilities 
PJCD~JABB) = p(s5us33us37) -!- (s10us18~s26) 
P(AG B) 
For subset 1, ‘Df(A@ B is denoted ‘D A$ B and is functionally related to the union of 
sample points S5 and s18 as follows: 1 f l  
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APPENDIX B - Continued 
P (S 5) = P (A) P (g) P PA,) Ppx0) P (“Ed P (“Bo) 
and since subset 1 precludes c ros s  detection, 
P(dX0) = .?Eo) = 1 
0 
’(“10) = O 
so 
P S5 = P(A) P(g) PidAS) P(d&) 
Further  
since 
P(dAo) = 0 
Then 
’(“18) = P(X) P(B) PfXs) P f B J  
since 
P(dKo) = .?Eo) = 1 
P(S26) = O 
p(s33) = O 
Additionally , 
since 
.Po) = .?Bo) = 0 
Therefore,  
o r  
where QA & P(A), the unreliability of A; and RBA P@,  the reliability of B. 
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APPENDIX B - Continued 
When both machines are identical, 
Q A = Q B =  A Q R A = R B e R  
Since the first t e rm in the numerator is the condition where A failed, .PES) = 1; 
likewise in  the second te rm,  P(%d = 1, since B failed, and 
If both detection mechanisms a r e  identical, 
PtDflA@B) = PPs) = P(dBs) 
The result  concludes that the probability of isolation for  the duplex system is identical to  
that of a simplex machine, that is, i i P2 = P3. 
A more interesting case  which appears to have the potential of increasing system 
probability of isolation is subset 2. A cross  isolating architecture can be physically 
affected by allowing each machine access  to the other machine's regis ters ,  in which case 
it is feasible for  one machine to diagnose faults in the other. Recalling the assumption 
that when a processor  announces the detection of a fault, the fault physically exists,  the 
following conditions occur for  c ros s  isolation: 
PPKJ = Pi"Eo) = 1 
P(d7i,) = P(dEo) = 1 
P("'is) = .("Eo) = 1 
P ?Ao)# 0 
P(dAo) f 0 
P("Ko) = P(dEs) = 1 .?Bo) f 0 
Ppc0) = P(dis,) = 1 .Po) f 0 
On applying these conditions for subset 2 
P37) 
P(:DflA@B) = p(s5us10us18) + p(s26us33us~~)  
Q A ~ B  + QBRA 
18 
APPENDIX B - Concluded 
the numerator becomes 
Allowing both machines to  be identical hardware gives 
and assuming all detectors have equal detection probabilities gives 
P (dAo) = PPs) .(“Bo) = P(dgs) 
Therefore,  
PkDflA@B) = P(Ai) + P(Bs) - P(As) P(Bs) 
This resul t  is identical except in notation to the text equation 
il i2 il i2 
iP2=  P 2 +  P2 - P2 * p2 
A Further ,  when P(As) = P(Bs) = P 
This resul t  is identical to that contained in the text given as 
y 2  
* 
i 2 P2 - P2 
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TABLE 1. - ALL POSSIBLE SAMPLE POINTS 
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 6 3  
A 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1  
B 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 ~ 0 0 1 1 0 0 l l 0 0 1 1 0 0 l l  
d A s O O O O l l ~ l O O O ~ ~ l l ~ O O O O l l l l O O O O ~ ~ ~ l  
d ~ o O O O O O O O O 1 l l l l l l l O O O O O O O O l l l l ~ l ~ l  
d B s O ~ O O O O ~ O ~ O ~ ~ ~ O O ~ l l l l l l l l l l l l ~ l ~ l  
d B , l ~ l l l l ~ l l l l ~ ~ l l ~ l l l l l l l l l l l l l l ~ l  
c 
- 0 -  
N 
- 1 -  csc - 
Figure 1 .  - Triplex computer architecture. 
- 
- - T  csc 
- 
Sl :- XI x2 x3 + XI x2 x3 + x1 x2 x3 
(Two out of th ree  channels operational) 
. 
- 0 -  
- a 
(One out of th ree  
channels operational)  so = XI x2 x3 
( A l l  channels - -  
operational)  s2 = x1 x2 "3 + 
X l  x2 x3 + 
x1 x2 x3 
- -  
c sc - - - I " -  
s3 = $ + '1. + x1 x2 ?3 
(System f a i l u r e )  
- 0 -  
- 
Figure 2 . -  Markov state space model of triplex channel RCS. 
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Figure 3.- Probability of system failure as a function of coverage. 
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